We investigate the role of intentions in two-player two-stage games. For this purpose we systematically vary the set of opportunity sets the rst mover can chose from and study how the second mover reacts not only to opportunities of gains but also of losses created by the choice of the rst mover. We nd that the possibility of gains for the second mover (generosity) and the risk of losses for the rst mover (vulnerability) are important drivers for second mover behavior. On the other hand, eciency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivations. We also nd that second movers compare the actual choice of the rst mover and the alternative choices that would have been available to him to allocations that involve equal material payos.
Introduction
Other-regarding preferences capture people's valuation not only for their own material resources but also for the material payos of other individuals as well as the perceived kindness of others' behavior. The theoretical literature on such preferences can be divided into two broad classes: models with distributional (unconditional) other-regarding preferences and models with intention-based (conditional) other-regarding preferences.
The distributional (or social) preference approach focuses on preferences over allocations of resources which are driven by distributional properties of the allocations. The altruism models by Andreoni & Miller (2002) and by fall into this category, as well as the models of inequality-aversion by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) , and the model of altruism and spite by Levine (1998) .
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The intention-based approach, on the other hand, tries to explain ndings neither consistent with self-regarding preferences nor in line with existing models of distributional concerns by agents' desire to react to others' intentions. In this strand, a second mover's preferences in a two-person two-stage game typically become more or less benevolent depending on the perceived kindness of the rst mover, and kindness is interpreted as generosity.
Two approaches have been proposed to investigate intention-based preferences theoretically.
First, in psychological game theory, a player evaluates another person's kindness by forming beliefs on what the other person believes the consequences of his choice are (see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004, for instance) . This necessarily involves second-order beliefs entering the picture. Models incorporating second-order beliefs provide quite sophisticated theories of reciprocity. Unfortunately, they often yield multiple equilibria even in quite simple games and nding these is often not trivial. To avoid these problems, a second approach, revealed intentions, has been proposed by Cox & Sadiraj (2007) ; Cox et al. (2008b) . In this approach a second mover's benevolence in a two-player two-stage game is a function of the relative kindness or unkindness of the rst mover as revealed by the objective characteristics of his (observed) choices. The rst mover's kindness, in turn, is determined by the relative generosity of the opportunity set implied by his choice relative to alternative opportunity sets he could have chosen instead.
The present paper contributes to the revealed intentions approach of conditional otherregarding preferences by exposing subjects in the lab to a large number of two-player two-stage games and by studying how second movers react to the opportunities of gains and losses for each player generated by the choice of the rst mover. Specically, we expose subjects in the lab to graphical representations of two-player two-stage games in which (i) the rst mover has to choose between two budget sets, one containing a single allocation, the other containing several possible payo allocations; and (ii) the second mover has to choose one of the available payo allocations in the non-trivial budget set provided the rst mover has chosen it. By systematically varying the two budget sets available to the rst mover, we investigate how opportunities of gains and losses for each player inuence the second mover's benevolence towards the rst mover. We nd that the possibility of gains for the second mover (generosity) and the risk of losses for the rst mover (vulnerability) are important drivers for second mover behavior. On the other hand, eciency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivators.
We also nd that second movers compare the actual choice of the rst mover and the alternative choices that would have been available to him to allocations that involve equal material payos.
Compared to the existing literature on conditional other-regarding preferences the present paper makes three critical contributions: The rst contribution is the introduction and implementation of an experimental design in which subjects are exposed to geometric representations of choice sets; this allows for the collection of a large number of observations per subject which facilitates statistical analysis at the level of the individual decision maker. Regarding this contribution the paper closest to ours is Fisman et al. (2007) . Those authors are interested in unconditional other-regarding concerns. As a consequence, in their experiments there is only one player role that of a dictator and each dictator is exposed to 50 dierent decision problems, each graphically represented as a linear budget set from which the subject can choose.
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Since our main research focus is on conditional other-regarding preferences we extend this approach by having two player roles the role of a rst mover and the role of a second mover; the 2 This is the baseline experiment in Fisman et al. (2007) . In addition to this the authors also investigate two alternative treatments: one has linear budget sets as the baseline but diers from the latter in that each dictator decision has now consequences for two other persons (i.e., budget sets are three-dimensional in this treatment); the other has two-dimensional budget sets as the baseline but diers from the latter in having allocations in the choice set that dier only in the material payo of the recipient, or only in the material payo of the dictator (i.e., budgets are step-shaped in this treatment).
2 rst mover chooses among graphical representations of opportunity sets while the second mover makes a dictator decision within a given opportunity set similar to the one subjects are asked to make in Fisman et al. (2007) . By varying the set of budget sets available to the rst mover we are able to investigate how the second mover's choice varies with the budget set actually chosen by the rst mover and with the counterfactual alternative opportunity set the rst mover could have chosen instead.
Our second innovation is the experimental investigation of the relative importance of dierent motives for behavior of players in extensive-form games. In this respect the papers closest to ours are Cox (2004) and Cox et al. ( , 2008b Cox et al. ( , 2014 . While Cox (2004) employs a triadic experimental design to disentangle the relative importance of conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences for behavior of second movers in the investment game, the present paper's main aim is to disentangle the relative importance of dierent basic motives for the conditional part of players' other-regarding preferences. Similar to Cox et al. ( , 2008b we suppose that the second mover in a two-player two-stage game cares about how the opportunity set chosen by the rst mover compares to alternative opportunity sets the rst mover could have chosen instead. However, while these papers compare opportunity sets in terms of generosity by the rst mover towards the second mover and focus on reciprocity as possible motivation for the second mover, we look not only at the possible gains for both players but also at possible losses and look at a broader array of possible motivations. In this latter respect our paper is similar to Cox et al. (2014) . However, in contrast to that work we look not only on trust game constellations and we also collect many observations per individual.
3 The latter feature of our experimental design allows us to estimate utility functions at the individual level in a withinsubjects design while Cox et al. (2014) derive their results from comparisons of aggregate data across treatments in a between-subjects design.
Our third innovation is the introduction of a silent social norm the equal-split norm into the revealed intentions approach. In this respect our paper is related to previous work on the importance of the equality norm for economic behavior see Fehr & Schmidt (1999) , Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) and Andreoni & Bernheim (2009) , for instance. While Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) stress the importance of the equal-split norm for unconditional other-regarding preferences, we show that this norm is also crucial for our understanding of conditional other-regarding preferences. Conditional other-regarding preferences might also be relevant for behavior in the experiments reported by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) . However, while Andreoni and Bernheim are interested in the impact of audience eects on behavior, we are interested in situations where audience eects are unlikely to play a role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our experimental design. It is followed by our conceptual framework in Section 3, which consists of a classication of choice characteristics, our model of social preferences, and predictions derived from the model.
In Section 4, we report our data and estimate the parameters of our model. Section 5 discusses our ndings and concludes.
Experimental Design
Our workhorse is a two-stage game with two players. In the rst stage, the rst mover (FM, he) makes a binary decision he chooses between a xed allocation (consisting of a payo for himself and a payo for the second mover) and an opportunity set containing several possible allocations. In the second stage, the second mover (SM, she) chooses a xed allocation from the 3 As will become clear later, the treatments in Cox et al. (2014) are all located in area 11 of Figure 2 while we expose subjects to decision situations in each of the cells in the gure.
3 opportunity set whenever the FM has chosen this option otherwise she has no move.
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We are interested in how the SM reacts to the opportunities of gains and losses for both players generated by the FM's choice. To investigate this question we expose subjects to a large number of graphical representations of choice situations. Across choice situations we systematically vary the set of opportunity sets available to the FM in the rst stage. By doing so, we can investigate how a wide range of intentions revealed by the FM's choice aect the SM's benevolence in the second stage.
The experiment was conducted by pencil and paper with students from a large Australian university. The subjects in the experiment were recruited via the ORSEE software by Greiner (2015) . After subjects read the instructions (they are contained in the Appendix), they were read aloud by an experimenter. Subjects answered a couple of control questions to assure their understanding of the task and the payo procedure. Then each participant was randomly assigned a role, either the role of a FM or the role of a SM. The randomization was such that in each session we had the same number of FMs and SMs and the participants kept their roles during the entire session. Subjects in both roles were faced with 60 graphical representations of sets of opportunity sets. Each set of opportunity sets consisted of two options, a xed payo-allocation and the 4 Our design can be seen as a (generalization of a) hybrid between an investment game (à la Berg et al. (1995)) where both players have rich choice sets (provided the FM has made a trusting choice) and a mini trust game (à la McCabe et al. (2003) ) where both players have only a binary choice to make (provided the FM has made the 'trusting choice'): In our design the FM has a binary choice to make (it can be interpreted as a choice between transferring a given amount s to the SM and not transferring anything), while the SM has a richer choice set (in our design a choice between seven allocations provided the FM has transferred s). Some of the games investigated by Charness & Rabin (2002) constitute special cases of our design. They found in these cases that the SM often reciprocated to the kindness of the FM (as revealed by his choice). Our design systematically varies the set of choices oered to the FM to investigate other potential factors driving the behavior of the SM. 4 opportunity to let the SM make a decision among a set of seven possible payo-allocations threaded on a downward sloping straight line. In the following we call the former option the point and the latter the line. If the FM chooses the point the SM has no further move while for the line she has to decide among the allocations in the non-trivial opportunity set. To obtain data from all SMs we used the strategy method: Each SM was asked to make a decision as if the paired FM had assigned her the opportunity to make the choice between the seven payo-allocations on the line. 5 Figure 1 shows a typical example of a decision situation. The task of the FM (Player 1) is to check one of the boxes below the gure indicating whether he prefers option A, the point, or option B, the line of hollow dots. The task of the SM (Player 2) is to indicate her choice by circling her preferred allocation on the line of hollow dots. The 60 decision tasks diered in the positions of the available opportunity sets and the positions were allocated randomly to pairs of subjects. The randomization ensured that lines stayed in the positive orthant and the location of the point was varied around the lines as depicted in Figure 2 . 6
In each session, one subject in the role of the FM and one subject in the role of the SM received exactly identical experimental questionnaires that is, two experimental subjects in each session faced exactly the same 60 decision tasks. At the end of the experiment we paired the subjects who received identical questionnaires. In each pair we then picked randomly one of the 60 decision tasks, and paid the participants the payos corresponding to their joint choices in this situation. Overall, sessions lasted around one hour and participants earned AUD 16.5, on average, plus a show up fee of AUD 5.
3 Conceptual Framework
Second Mover's Social Preferences
In line with the revealed intentions approach, we suppose that the SM cares about how the opportunity set chosen by the FM compares to the alternative opportunity set the FM could have chosen instead. Similar to Cox, Friedman & Sadiraj (2008) , we look at the possible gains for both players resulting from the FM's choice. Similar to the companion paper Cox et al. (2014) we extend this approach by also looking at the possible losses for both players. Compared to Cox et al. (2014) we study a richer array of possible motivations covering all constellations displayed in Figure 2. 7 We discuss the features of the areas in this gure in the next subsection.
To allow for errors in decision making, we adopt a random utility approach. In our experiment, in each of the 60 decision tasks, the SM's opportunity set consists of seven discrete options. We therefore use a random utility discrete choice framework see Train (2009) for details.
5 While there are potential eects of using the strategy method instead of the direct-response method (such as a reduction in incentives or a hot vs. cold eect that might aect the participants' choices see Zizzo, 2010, for a discussion), the experimental literature reports no case in which a treatment eect was observed with the strategy method and not with the direct-response method (see Brandts & Charness, 2011). 6 The randomization also limited concerns for an indirect experimenter eect whereby participants observing systematic variations of a point location relative the same line would infer that their behavior is expected to change as a consequence of the relative position of the point. 
where x s is the subject's own material payo which contributes positively to her utility, x o is the payo of the other subject and α and θ are parameters, both supposed to be (weakly) smaller than one. The parameter θ is called the agent's emotional state and the eect of the other's payo on utility depends on the sign of θ. A positive θ means that the individual under consideration cares positively for the other agent in the sense that she is willing to give up money to increase the other's payo. The agent's willingness to pay which is the amount of own income the agent is willing to give up in order to increase the other agent's income by one unit is given by:
As is easily seen, the larger θ, the higher the WTP. Note further that α measures the importance of relative payos. For positive θ, α = 1 yields linear preferences implying that the WTP is independent of relative payos, while α < 1 yields convex preferences implying that the WTP 6 and with it the agent's benevolence towards the other agent increases as the other's relative payo decreases.
Here we adopt this functional form and in line with Cox et al. (2007) we capture intentionbased benevolence from the SM by allowing her emotional state θ to depend on the FM's previous choice. Specically, we allow a SM's θ to depend on the observable characteristics as dened in the next subsection: θ = θ(observable characteristics of actual choice by the FM).
Classication of First Mover's Choices, Attributed Intentions and their Impact on Second Movers' Behavior
The classication in Figure 2 is based on the gain/loss principle applied to both players, i.e.
whether the opportunity set that was chosen by the FM (the line) comes with an actual or potential increase or decrease of each player's payo compared to the not chosen opportunity set (the point). Our rst hypothesis is motivated by the experimental evidence indicating that reciprocity is an important driver for behavior in games. Reciprocation entails responding to positive perceived kindness with positive kindness, and to negative perceived kindness with negative kindness (Rabin, 1993 , Charness & Rabin, 2002 , Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004 .
In a material context kindness is usually equated with generosity. To formulate a hypothesis is said to imply a sure loss for the SM.
b) If the line includes allocations for which the SM's payo is (weakly) higher, and allocations for which the SM's payo is (weakly) lower compared to her payo in the point, the FM's choice of the line is said to imply a potential gain for the SM.
c) If the line only includes allocations which (weakly) increase the SM's payo compared to the point, the FM's choice of the line is said to imply a sure gain for the SM.
Using this classication of FM behavior, it seems plausible that choices of the FM that imply a sure gain for the SM are interpreted by the SM as more generous than choices that imply a potential gain for the SM, and that choices that imply a potential gain for the SM are interpreted as more generous than choices that imply a sure loss for the SM. This consideration yields our rst prediction:
Hypothesis 1 (Impact of Generosity) The SM's benevolence increases with the level of generosity implied by the choice of the FM. That is, the SM becomes progressively more benevolent when we move from situations where the FM's choice implies a sure loss for the SM, to situations where the FM's choice implies a potential gain for the SM, to situations where the FM's choice implies a sure gain for the SM.
Our second hypothesis is based on experimental evidence indicating that the vulnerability of the FM is an important driver for the behavior of the SM in the investment game (see Cox et al, 7 2014 for an investigation of the role of vulnerability in the investment game We also suspect that FM choices that correspond to a sacrice inuence the behavior of the SM.
This is the content of Hypothesis 2b. Note that Hypothesis 2b does not make any prediction on how the eect of sacrice compares to the eect of vulnerability.
Hypothesis 2b (Impact of Sacrice) The SM's benevolence increases if the FM's choice of the line implies a sacrice for him. Specically, the SM becomes more benevolent when we move from situations where the FM's choice of the line implies a sure gain for the FM, to situations where the FM's choice of the line implies a sure loss for the FM.
Our next hypothesis is based on the idea that SMs may reward FM choices that have the potential to increase the payos of both parties. This conjecture is motivated by the experimental evidence indicating that eciency concerns are important for behavior in the lab and in the eld (see Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fehr et al., 2006, among others) . To formulate a hypothesis regarding the impact of eciency concerns on SM behavior we characterize FM choices according to the payo consequences for both players as follows:
Denition 3 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM from a collection consisting of a point and a line. Suppose the FM chooses the line. If the line includes allocations which represent a Pareto improvement relative to the point, the FM's choice of the line is said to allow for a deal.
We then state:
Hypothesis 3 (Impact of Deal) The SM's benevolence increases if the FM's choice of the line allows for a deal. That is, the SM becomes more benevolent when we move from situations where the choice of the FM does not allow for a Pareto improvement to situations that allow for a mutual improvement.
Our next (and last) hypothesis is motivated by the large experimental literature on trust and trustworthiness. In experimental economics the most frequently used instrument to study the importance of those concepts for behavior is the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) 
Data and Results
We rst provide an overview of the data collected in our experiment and a descriptive analysis.
We then proceed with the parameter estimation of our model.
Data
We carried out 14 experimental sessions involving 190 subjects in total. Since our research focus lies on the conditional part of an individual's social preferences, we are only interested in the data collected from experimental SMs. Since we collected the data via the strategy method, our data set consists of 60 decisions for each of the 95 SMs.
Looking at the individual data, we nd that 37 subjects (that is, 38.9 percent of our SM population) behaved in a perfectly selsh way by choosing the lowermost point on the line in each of the 60 decision situations. Hence, θ = 0 and u(x s , x o ) = x s for almost 40% of our SM sample. This compares to previous studies (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000) , where typically completely selsh behavior was reported for between 20 and 50 percent of individuals.
For our further analyses, we exclude the purely selshly acting SMs from our data sample and focus on the 58 participants that reveal some form of other-regarding behavior.
8 The overall distribution of the choices of those SMs is presented in Figure 3 and Table 1 .
9 In Table 1 we see that the uppermost four points on the line (points 4-7) are chosen in only 27.6 percent of decision tasks. This is not really surprising, as point 7 is the most benevolent decision a SM can make, and point 1 is the least benevolent one. Thus, the subjects in the subsample under consideration although not purely selsh have a tendency to care more for their own than for the other's payo. In a rst step, we analyze whether the characteristics dened in Section 3 inuence SM behavior.
For this purpose we dene a set of binary variables reecting denitions 1 and 2 introduced in Our rst observation supports our main hypothesis that the choice of the SM on the line depends signicantly on the nature of the counterfactual choice the FM could have made: Figure   4 displays the mean SM choice as a function of the characteristics of the FM's choice. The signicance of the dierence in means is indicated using t-tests (from regressions on dummies using cluster robust variance to control for the non-independence of observed choices within participants). The data in Figure 4 suggests that the choices of SMs become more benevolent if the level of generosity increases from SM SL to SM P G (p = 0.006) and from SM P G to SM SG (p < 0.001). SMs seem also to become more benevolent if the FM's choice implies vulnerability moving from F M SG to F M P G (p < 0.001) or sacrice moving from F M SG to F M SL 8 Since θ = 0 for purely selshly acting individuals, the behavior of subjects in this subsample is not informative about how intentions inuence social preferences.
9 The experiment was conducted by pen and paper and a small number of answers (N=17) were missing in the questionnaires. This leaves a dataset of 3463 observations.
(p = 0.012). The eect of the counterfactual choice the FM could have made on SM's behavior can also be seen in Figure 5 . In this gure the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of SM choices on the line are represented depending on the level of generosity, the level of vulnerability, and on whether the choice of the FM allows for a Deal or reveals T rust. A rst-order stochastically dominating CDF reects more benevolence. It can be seen that the CDF for choices exhibiting SM SG rstorder stochastically dominates the CDF for choices featuring SM P G (KS test: p = 0.025), which in turn rst-order stochastically dominates the CDF for FM choices featuring SM SL (KS test: p = 0.005). This nding strengthens the previous result that a more generous choice by the FM triggers a more benevolent response by the SM, and therewith provides further support for Hypothesis 1.
We also nd support for Hypothesis 2. The CDF of choices featuring F M P G rst-order stochastically dominates the CDF of choices with F M SG (KS test: p = 0.003), which is clearly in line with Hypothesis 2a. It is also the case that the CDF of choices featuring F M SL rst-order stochastically dominates the CDF of choices with F M SG (KS test: p = 0.034), which is in line with Hypothesis 2b. Comparing the distribution of choices featuring F M P G to the distribution of choices featuring F M SL we see that they dier (KS test: p = 0.001) although the mean choice is statistically indistinguishable between the two situations. Specically, the distribution of SMs' responses to F M SL features both more most altruistic choices and more least altruistic choices. In the second row of Figure 5 we see that the CDF of choices that allow for a Deal rstorder stochastically dominates the CDF of choices without a Deal available (KS test: p < 0.001).
However, as previously stated this nding might be confounded by the fact that if the FM's choice allows for a Deal, it necessarily also entails either SM SG or SM P G which might be responsible for the eect on SM's benevolence. Finally, we also nd some support for Hypothesis 4: The CDF of SM choices featuring T rust almost rst-order stochastically dominates the CDF of SM choices not revealing T rust (KS test: p < 0.001). Here again, this nding might be confounded by the fact that the SM may simply react to the generosity and vulnerability which characterize the trust situation.
Disentangling Revealed Intentions
The structural model described in Subsection 3.1 makes it possible to disentangle the eects of dierent characteristics of the FM's choice on the SM's behavior. Following the random utility approach (Train, 2009) , we assume that the utility of SM i for payo pair x = (x s , x o ) in a choice situation featuring the characteristic combination j includes a stochastic term which represents the unobserved part of utility (including quixotic variations in utility due to cognitive limitations when assessing the options): 
Here, θ i j is the emotional state of SM i when she observes that the FM has chosen the line in a choice situation where the alternative choice he could have made (that is, the point) is located in area j ∈ {01, 02, 10, 110, 111, 12, 20, 21, 22} as dened in Figure 2 . This formulation assumes that motives are additive in the sense that adding a given motive has the same eect independently of whether other motives are present or absent. We will relax this assumption later on. Note also that this formulation allows for individual heterogeneity in social preferences with the inclusion of an individual specic term θ i . We follow a standard approach in discrete choice modeling (Train, 2009 ) in assuming ε ; Gumbel(λ). This implies that the choice model is a non-linear multinomial logit model with the probability that a given allocation x is chosen among a set X of possible allocations given by:
, where λ is the subjects' precision parameter. 10 We estimate the parameters α and θ i j by maximum-likelihood. Each participant provided 60 data points, we therefore cluster the standard error by participant. Table 2 reports the estimates of our basic model. As expected α < 1 which indicates convex preferences. In the sequel we focus our discussion on the parameter θ j since this is the parameter related to our research question. The impact of the characteristics of the FM's choice on this parameter is measured in comparison to the reference categories F M SG and SM SL , respectively. These reference categories are arguably associated with the lowest level of benevolence by the SM.
The parameter estimates in Table 2 suggest that starting from the reference categories an increase in the level of generosity from the FM towards the SM, as well as an increase in the FM's vulnerability indeed have a signicant positive impact on the SM's altruism coecient θ and thus on her benevolence. Regarding generosity, we nd that a sure gain for the SM (SM SG ) has a signicant eect on the SM's benevolence while a sheer potential gain (SM P G ) does not have a signicant eect. This result provides partial support for Hypothesis 1:
Result 1 (Impact of Generosity) The SM's altruism coecient θ and therewith her benevolence increases with the level of generosity implied by the choice of the FM. However, the eect is signicant only for situations where the FM's choice implies a sure gain for the SM.
Turning to the eect of vulnerability, we see that F M P G raises θ signicantly. This result conrms the nding of the descriptive analysis and is in line with Hypothesis 2a. In line with Hypothesis 2b we also nd a positive eect of F M SL on the SM's benevolence. Comparing the two we see that the estimated coecients of F M SL and F M P G are roughly equal. Thus, acts that make the FM vulnerable and acts that imply a sure loss for the FM seem to have a similar impact on the intention-perception of the SM as revealed by her behavior.
Result 2 (Impact of Vulnerability and Sacrice) The SM's altruism coecient θ and therewith her benevolence increases if the choice of the FM entails vulnerability (potential loss for the FM) or sacrice (sure loss for the FM). Comparing the two eects we see that they are similar in size.
10 This is called the Luce model (see Wilcox, 2008) .
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Model (N=3,463): Result 4 (Impact of Trust) The expression of trust has no eect in itself on the SM's altruism coecient θ and therewith on her benevolence.
As previously mentioned our estimation of model (2) assumes that motives are additive in equation (3). We now relax the additivity assumption and allow for possible interactions between the FM's vulnerability and his generosity towards the SM. Specically, we dene a dummy for each area displayed in Figure 2 and estimate the model: , 02, 10, 110, 111, 12, 20, 21, 22}. Our chosen reference category is again F M SG × SM SL (area 00 in Figure 2 ). The estimation results of this model are presented in Figure 6 . By and large the results conrm our earlier ndings. We observe that the SM's benevolence is high in situations where the FM's choice While SM P G and F M P G in isolation are not enough to inuence the benevolence of the SM (β 01 and β 10 are not signicantly dierent from zero), it is noteworthy that their joint presence (in β 110 , and in β 111 ) does. It therefore looks like there is an interaction between the eect of generosity and vulnerability. Increasing the level of generosity to SM SG enhances the SM's benevolence even further (β 12 is signicantly larger than β 111 and β 110 ), assuring the highest level of benevolence by the SM observed in our experiment.
Turning to hypotheses 3 and 4 about the impact of Deal and T rust on the behavior of the SM we see that the coecients β 110 and β 111 do not signicantly dier from each other. Area 111 corresponds to FM choices revealing T rust and it diers from area 110 by the presence of a Deal. Thus, the relatively high level of benevolence from the SM observed in the area 111 seems solely be driven by the presence of F M P G and SM P G . This nding supports and strengthens our previously stated results 3 and 4.
Overall we conclude that relaxing the hypothesis that motives are additive does not change our previous results qualitatively: Positive reciprocity whereby a generous choice by the FM triggers a benevolent response by the SM and vulnerability-responsiveness whereby a choice by the FM that exposes him to the risk of losing money triggers a benevolent response seem to be important drivers for SM behavior, while deal-responsiveness where the SM reacts positively to choices that create the possibility of mutual improvements or trust-responsiveness where the SM rewards acts that reveal trust seem behaviorally less relevant.
Interpreting Intentions from Observed Actions and Salient Social Norms
In the precedent analyses, we have investigated whether a SM's benevolence is aected by the objective characteristics of the FM's choice specically by how his actual choice compares to the counterfactual alternative choice he could have made instead. By doing so we have extended the revealed intention approach and looked at the possible gains and losses created by the FM's decision. Here we argue that this approach can be extended further by incorporating the possible role of preexisting social norms in the analysis. Social norms are by denition shared and common knowledge (Krupka & Weber, 2013) . In games where allocations of resources are made between players, prevailing social norms may point to a fair allocation, that is, one which would be considered as such by the dierent players. In an experiment where subjects enter the laboratory as equals, where they are allocated randomly to their roles and where the money to be divided is a windfall provided by the experimenter, it seems plausible that fairness norms point to an equal split. Even though equal sharing might not be the only norm prevalent in the population of experimental subjects (e.g., asymmetry of roles may be considered as giving dierent entitlements to dierent players), it is likely to be the most prevalent norm among all possible splits.
A look at the choices of experimental SMs suggests that the equality norm has indeed an impact. Figure 7 shows by how much the SM's choice diers from the least unequal allocation (the feasible allocation on the line that is closest to the 45 degree line, henceforth LUA). 11 Positive (negative) entries in Figure 7 correspond to choices on the line where the SM earns more (less) in material terms than the associated FM. As can be seen from the gure there is a large concentration of SM choices at the LUA (more than a third of all choices by experimental SMs are at the LUA) and there is a pronounced discontinuity in the distribution of choices immediately to the left of the LUA, arguably because there is no social norm that dictates to give more than the fair share (implied by the LUA) to the other player. It therefore seems that the 50-50 split indeed plays a role for SM behavior.
We next ask whether the interpretation of the FM's intentions by the SM is inuenced by this norm. To address this question we extend the revealed intentions approach by investigating whether choices are aected by the fairness of the counterfactual choice, the point, taking equality as the yardstick.Specically, we estimate θ i j , using equation (2), separately for situations where the point is above the 45 degree line and situations where it is below that line. Table 3 by being generous, the FM is oering potential gains to the SM even though the SM was already advantaged by the initial allocation. By making himself vulnerable, the FM gives the possibility to the SM to make the FM worse o, even though the FM was already disadvantaged by the initial allocation. Therefore, one interpretation is that in such situations the generosity from the FM is perceived as particularly kind and the choice to make himself vulnerable particularly noticeable.
Turning to the result that the SM is relatively benevolent in the F M SL × SM SL situation, we observe that the choice of the line by the FM in this constellation can potentially be interpreted as an attempt to avoid a split that is unfavorable to him, even if this leads to a loss in the payos of both players. To test whether this interpretation is consistent with the data, we re-estimate the model (2) allowing for dierent values of the parameter θ in F M SL × SM SL situations above and below the diagonal. Table 4 displays the results. Column (1) allows θ to depend on a dummy P oint F M taking a value 1 if the point favors the FM and zero if it favors the SM (we do not consider situations of equality). We nd that the benevolence is overall larger for situations where the FM abandoned a relatively advantageous point when choosing the line (p < 0.001).
In column (2), we interact this dummy with a dummy for the F M SL × SM SL situation. We nd that SMs are signicantly more benevolent when the F M SL × SM SL situation appears for points below the diagonal. This eect vanishes when the xed allocation is above the diagonal.
These results are important for the revealed intentions approach. They show that the reaction of the SM to the FM's choice is not only shaped by dierences between the opportunities generated by the choice set selected by the FM and the opportunities which could have been generated by a counterfactual choice. The SM's reaction seems also to depend on how a prevailing social norm of fairness labels each of these opportunities as fair or not. In the case of our experiment, the puzzling behavior of the SM in F M SL × SM SL situations makes sense if the SM interprets the FM's choice as an attempt to avoid a split that is unfavorable to him. This, as a consequence, may induce the SM to make a more benevolent choice than in F M SG × SM SL situations. By contrast, benevolence by the SM is not observed when the (not chosen) point was
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Model: Model (N=3,203) : Table 4 : Benevolence as a function of the position of the (not chosen) point relative to the equal-material payo line.
Discussion
The empirical study of conditional other-regarding preferences based on higher-order beliefs is dicult because such beliefs are not observable and because eliciting them is a tricky task. An elegant alternative to belief-based conditional other-regarding preferences is the revealed intentions approach where a player cares about the generosity of the opportunity set chosen by another player compared to other opportunity sets that could have been chosen. The present paper has extended the revealed intentions approach by allowing agents to care not only about the possibility of gains generated by other agents' actions but also about the possibility of losses. In a two-player two-stage game, we have investigated how the second mover's other-regarding preferences are aected by dierent characteristics of the opportunity set chosen by the rst mover compared to a counterfactual opportunity set the rst mover could have chosen. By systematically varying the set of opportunity sets the rst mover can choose from and investigating the response of the second mover to the actual choice of the rst mover and the alternative choice he could have made, we were able to elicit how the second mover reacts to a wide variety of intentions as revealed by the rst mover's choice.
We found that second movers do react to the possibilities of gains and losses generated for them and for the associated rst mover. Second movers are typically more benevolent when the choice of the rst mover creates an opportunity of gain for the second mover. This can be interpreted as a manifestation of positive reciprocity from the second mover. We have also seen that second movers react to the payo consequences for the rst mover implied by his choice with second movers becoming more benevolent when the rst mover chooses an opportunity set that implies either a potential or a sure loss for him. These results suggest that future research should investigate further how self-imposed vulnerability and losses of a player aect the intention-based preferences of another player.
Our approach makes it possible to study complex revealed preferences as specic combinations of possible gains and losses for each player. We looked into two of such combinations. First we investigated whether the second mover reacts to opportunities of joint improvements oered by the choice of the rs mover. When a rst mover chooses an opportunity set that allows for a Pareto improvement compared to the alternative opportunity set he could have chosen instead, the second mover might consider this as a proposal saying let's make a deal. Our results indicate that whether the second mover reads such an intention from the rst mover's choice or not, her behavior is not aected by the presence of such mutually benecial improvements as such.
Second, we have investigated whether in situations typical to trust games, the choice of a trusting opportunity set by the rst mover has a positive eect on the benevolence of the second mover.
Here again, we nd no evidence that the second mover's choice is aected in such situations, beyond the eects of possible gains and losses. These two results are of interest to understand the specic motivations that shape second mover's behavior in trust games.
Another signicant contribution of our study is to show that incorporating a salient social norm, here the equality norm, can be useful to discriminate between dierent revealed intentions. In its original formulation, the revealed intentions approach relies only on the comparison of actual choices to choices that would have been available but have not been made. However, shared social norms may create salient expectations which also aect behavior. In such cases it is simple to extend the revealed intentions approach by looking not only at how the opportunity set chosen by a player compares to the sets not chosen, but also at how it compares to the set of allocations suggested by the social norm. In our experiment we nd that this approach is useful to understand how some choices are interpreted by the second mover.
Overall, our study shows that it is possible to study a rich array of revealed intentions, without eliciting beliefs, by systematically varying the set of opportunity sets available to the rst mover in a two-player two-stage game and by investigating the response of the second mover to the actual choice of the rst mover and the alternative choice he could have made instead. This paper opens the path for further experimental work on revealed intentions. One may, for instance, consider that not only the possibility of gains and losses but their magnitude would have an inuence on social preferences. Building on the present approach and on the work by Fisman et al. (2007) , further research might extend the ndings presented here by investigating a richer set of revealed intentions using more complex choice sets than our, purposely simple, 19 lines and points.
General Instructions

General Remarks
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. Research foundations have provided funds for conducting this research. During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make a series of decisions. The money you will earn will depend partly on your own choices and the choices of other participants and partly on chance. All payments will be made confidentially and in cash at the end of the experiment. Please consider all expressions as gender neutral.
Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions after we finish reading the instructions please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.
Two Roles
There are two roles in this experiment: Player 1 and Player 2. At the start of the experiment you will be assigned to one of these two roles through a randomized procedure. Your role will then remain the same throughout the experiment. Your role will only be known to you. Each Player 1 will be randomly paired with a Player 2. No one will ever be informed about the identity of the participant you were paired with nor will anybody else be informed about the choices you made.
Earnings
You will receive $5 for arriving in time. Depending on your decisions, the decisions of other participants and chance you will receive an addional amount according to the rules explained below.
Privacy
This experiment is designed such that nobody, including the experimenters and the other participants, will ever be informed about the choices you or anyone else will make in the experiment. Neither your name nor your student ID will appear on any decision form. The only identifying label on the decision forms will be a number that is known only to you. At the end of the experiment, you are asked one-by-one to collect your earnings in an envelope from a person who has no involvement in and no information about the experiment. 
Appendix: Instructions
The Decision Situation
The experiment consists of 60 decision situations, which are given by graphs. You are asked to choose your preferred option in each of the 60 graphs. Only one graph will be randomly selected for cash payments; thus you should decide which option you prefer in each graph independently of your choice in other graphs.
The figure below gives an example of a decision situation. In each situation there are two roles: Player 1 and Player 2.
The first move is made by Player 1. He is asked to choose between two options: Option A and Option B.
In each graph Option A is a fixed allocation implying a payment for Player 1 and a payment for Player 2. Option A is always represented by a filled dot in the graph. In the graph below Option A implies a payment of $8 for Player 1 and a payment of $8 for Player 2.
In each graph Option B means that Player 1 gives Player 2 the opportunity to make a choice among a set of possible allocations. Each allocation gives a fixed payment to Player 1 and a fixed payment to Player 2. Option B is always represented by several hollow dots on a line. In the graph below Option B gives Player 2 the choice between 7 different allocations. For instance, the uppermost point on the line represents an allocation that gives a payment of $16 for Player 1 and a payment of $4 for Player 2.
Decision Task -Player 1
If you are assigned the role of Player 1, you are asked to make a choice in each of the 60 graphs between Option A (the filled dot assigning you and Player 2 a fixed amount of money) and Option B (in which you let Player 2 make a choice between several hollow dots each assigning you and Player 2 an amount of dollars).
Please check one of the boxes below the figure indicating whether you prefer Option A, the filled dot, or Option B, the line of hollow dots.
Decision Task -Player 2
If you are assigned the role of Player 2, you do not know what decision Player 1 is about to make. You are therefore asked -in each of the 60 graphs -to make a choice as if Player 1 has chosen Option B, giving you the opportunity to decide on a payoff allocation on the line of hollow dots. The allocation that Player 1 could have chosen is indicated by the filled dot. 
Earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the 60 decision tasks is chosen randomly and cash payments (in addition to the show up fee of $5) are determined for each pair of participants.
If Player 1 has chosen Option A in that decision task, then Player 1 and the Player 2 paired with this Player 1 will receive the associated payments.
If Player 1 has chosen Option B in that decision task, then the payments for both players depend on the choice made by the paired Player 2. Each of the available choices of the paired Player 2 again implies a payment for both players.
Example: Suppose the graph shown on the previous page is chosen for cash payments in addition to the participation fee. If Player 1 has chosen Option A in this situation than Player 1 receives a payment of $8 and Player 2 a payment of $8. If Player 1 has chosen Option B instead, then the payments of both players depend on the choices of Player 2. Suppose Player 1 has chosen Option B and Player 2 has chosen the uppermost point on the line. Then player 1 receives a payment of $16 and Player 2 a payment of $4.
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Control Questions
Question 1: Task of Player 1 Please indicate by a cross which one of the answers about the decision task of Player 1 is true.
Player 1 can choose any of the points on the line with the hollow dots. Player 1 has no decision to make if Player 2 chooses the filled dot. Player 1 can choose the filled dot or he can let Player 2 pick one of the hollow dots. Player 1 can choose any point in the figure.
Question 2: Task of Player 2 Please indicate by a cross which one of the answers about the decision task of Player 2 is true. Player 2 can choose any of the points on the line with the hollow dots. Player 2 has no decision to make if Player 1 chooses the filled dot. Player 2 can choose the filled dot or he can let Player 1 pick one of the hollow dots. Player 2 can choose any point in the figure. 
